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Abstract
We study versions of second-order bounded arithmetic where in-
duction and comprehension formulae are positive or where the
underlying logic is intuitionistic, examining their relationships to
monotone and deep inference proof systems for propositional logic.
In the positive setting a restriction of a Paris-Wilkie (PW) style
translation yields quasipolynomial-size monotone propositional
proofs from Π01 arithmetic theorems, as expected. We further show
that, when only polynomial induction is used, quasipolynomial-
size normal deep inference proofs may be obtained, via a graph-
rewriting normalisation procedure from earlier work.
For the intuitionistic setting we calibrate the PW translation
with the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuition-
istic implication to recover a transformation to monotone proofs.
By restricting type level we are able to identify an intuitionistic
theory, I1U12 , for which the transformation yields quasipolynomial-
size monotone proofs. Conversely, we show that I1U12 is powerful
enough to prove the soundness of monotone proofs, thereby estab-
lishing a full correspondence.
1. Introduction
Bounded arithmetic has been a fruitful way to relate complexity
classes with logical theories and propositional proof systems. For
example Paris and Wilkie showed that proofs of Π01-sentences in
the theory I∆01 translate to classes of polynomial-size Hilbert-
Frege (HF) proofs of bounded depth [27]; conversely, the sound-
ness of bounded-depth HF systems can be proved in such theories.2
In this work we identify theories of bounded arithmetic for
monotone and deep inference proof systems, via positive and in-
tuitionistic versions of well-known theories in the literature.
Deep inference proof complexity has received much attention
in recent years, and the complexity of the minimal system, KS,
is considered as yet unresolved [7] [22] [15]. While an extension
1 This is the fragment of Peano Arithmetic with induction is restricted to
∆0-formulae.
2 Strictly speaking, we also require the ‘Ω1 axiom’, to allow simple manip-
ulation of sequences.
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
of it, KS+, is known to quasipolynomially3 simulate HF systems4
[22] [8], there is neither such a simulation known for KS nor some
nontrivial lower bound separating the two systems.
These systems can be viewed as subclasses of tree-like mono-
tone proofs (exemplified in e.g. [5] and [22]), i.e. sequent calculus
proofs free of negation steps (MLK ), studied in e.g. [28], [4] and
[2].5 We exploit this correspondence in the present work and, for
simplicity of exposition, work with rewriting systems MON and
NOR instead of KS+ and KS, respectively [16].
The starting point of this work is the second-order framework
due to Buss [9], as developed by Krajı́cek in [25]. 6 In Sect. 3 we
consider ‘positive’ versions of the theories U ij and V
i
j , where set
variables may not occur in negative context in non-logical rules.
We address some proof-theoretic issues and give a deep inference
style presentation of the Paris-Wilkie (PW) translation to MON in
Dfn. 24. The main result of this section is Thm. 27, that proofs in
the image of a certain theory MU12 can be transformed to NOR-
proofs in quasipolynomial time, via graph-rewriting normalisation
procedures from [19] and analysis of their complexity from [17].
In Sect. 4, in order to obtain converse statements to these trans-
lations, we turn to intuitionistic variants of these theories, allowing
us to recover the ability to conduct some metalogical reasoning.
The two main contributions of this section are Lemma 39, a sort of
witnessing theorem that eliminates the presence of second-order ex-
istential quantifiers in a proof, and Dfn. 44, an adaptation of the PW
translation by the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of
intuitionistic logic, ultimately yielding monotone proofs. For a cer-
tain theory, I1U12 , we obtain in Cor. 46 that proofs in the image of
the translation can be made tree-like (i.e. in MON) efficiently.
In Sect. 5 we consider reflection principles: formal statements
of the soundness of a system. The main result of this section
is Thm. 49, that I1U12 proves the soundness of MON, thereby
establishing a full correspondence between I1U12 and MON.
Finally, in Sect. 6 we present some further discussion and re-
sults, and in Sect. 7 we give some concluding remarks.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Arnold Beckmann for
many helpful conversations on this line of research. I would also
like to thank Paola Bruscoli, Alessio Guglielmi, Tom Gundersen,
Lutz Straßburger and others in the deep inference community for
their feedback on early versions of this work. This work has been
partially supported by the ANR-14-CE25-0005 Elica project.
3 A quasipolynomial is a function 2log
O(1) n.
4 In fact, it is widely believed that a polynomial simulation holds, cf. [23].
5 Indeed, it was in this setting that the aforementioned quasipolynomial
simulation was first proved [2].
6 We choose not to work in the framework developed by Cook and Nguyen
[13] since many relevant distinctions, e.g. polynomial induction vs. regular
induction, seem to collapse in that setting.
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2. Preliminaries
We generally follow the notations and conventions from [25],
and occasionally [13] as well. Throughout this paper we adopt
quasipolynomial-time, i.e. 2log
O(1) n-time, as our model of feasi-
ble computation. A polylogarithm is a function logO(1) n.
2.1 Propositional and second-order logic
We formulate propositional logic (PL) with connectives ⊥, >, ∨,
∧, ⊃ and countably many propositional variables, e.g. p, q etc. We
may use other common connectives as abbreviations for their usual
definitions in this basis. Namely, we write ¬ϕ for ϕ ⊃ ⊥ and
ϕ ≡ ψ for (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ). We often omit brackets for
long conjunctions and disjunctions for readability, and also for long
implications when the right-most bracketing is assumed.
For arithmetic theories, we work in a two-sorted first-order
logic, which we refer to as second-order logic (SOL) in line with
the literature. SOL extends PL by variables x, y, z etc. for individu-
als,X,Y, Z etc. for sets (or strings), symbols =1,=2 for individual
and set equality, respectively, and quantifiers ∃1, ∀1 and ∃2,∀2 for
individual and set quantification respectively. There is also a non-
logical binary infix symbol ∈ expressing membership of an indi-
vidual in a set. There may be further non-logical symbols, in which
case we use metavariables s, t and S, T to range over individual
and set terms respectively.
We sometimes write Xx or X(x) instead of x ∈ X . In all
settings, we denote formulae by Greek letters ϕ,ψ etc., possibly
indicating free variables within parentheses, e.g. ϕ(x, y).
Definition 1 (Contexts and polarity). A context ϕ[·] is a formula
with a hole in place of a subformula. We say that a context ϕ[·] is
positive if its hole is under the left-scope of an even number of ⊃
symbols; otherwise it is negative. E.g. the context ([·] ⊃ ϕ) ⊃ ψ is
positive, while the context [·] ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) is negative.
A formula is positive or monotone if no set symbol occurs in
negative context.
Convention 2 (Sequent calculus). We work with a usual sequent
calculus LK 2 over our basis of connectives, with multiplicative
formulations of branching logical rules and additive versions of
non-branching logical rules,7 e.g. as presented in [9]. In all cases
cedents are multisets of formulae and the symbol → delimits the
two sides of a sequent, e.g. a typical sequent is written Γ→ ∆. We
write LK for the propositional fragment of LK 2.
A sequent is positive if it contains only positive formulae. The
monotone (propositional) sequent calculus MLK is obtained from
the propositional calculus LK by removing the ⊃ rules.
The intuitionistic caclulus LJ 2 is obtained from LK 2 by insist-
ing that the RHS of each sequent in a proof consists of at most one
formula. For this we must also alter the ∨-l rule slightly as follows:
Γ, ϕ→ ∆ Σ, ψ → ∆
∨-l
Γ,Σ, ϕ ∨ ψ → ∆
A (dag-like) proof is a list of sequents such that each one
follows from previous ones by a rule of LK 2. We call a proof tree-
like if its dependency graph is a tree, i.e. each sequent is used at
most once as the premiss of an inference step.
2.2 Bounded arithmetic and the Paris-Wilkie translation
We work in the setting of [25] (itself based on [9]), and refer the
reader to those works for comprehensive preliminary material on
bounded arithmetic.
We consider second-order theories over the vocabulary,
L2 = {0, 1,+,×, | · |,#, b ·2c, <}
7 Here, we mean ‘additive’ and ‘multiplicative’ in the sense of linear logic.
with the usual interpretation of symbols, as construed in [25]. As
usual, set symbols are now equipped with bounding terms and
associated axioms. We will write X ≤ t for the positive atomic
formula s ≤ t, where s is the bounding term of X .8 We will write
ΣBi and Π
B
i for the classes of formulae strict-Σ
1,b
i and -Π
1,b
i resp.
Remark 3. While we are borrowing some notation from [13] for
readability, we do not formally follow their framework. They in-
clude a length term for sets, which makes it difficult to distinguish
the forms of induction PIND and IND we consider later on. How-
ever we do assume that set symbols are equipped with a bounding
term as in [25], when necessary.
We assume that all our theories contain some appropriate set
BASIC of basic axioms (including extensionality and bounded-
ness of sets), which can be found in [25].
Definition 4 (Induction and comprehension). We define the fol-
lowing axioms:
CA : ∃X ≤ y.∀x < y.(Xx ≡ ϕ(x))
IND : ϕ(0) ⊃ ∀x.(ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x+ 1)) ⊃ ∀x.ϕ(x)
PIND : ϕ(0) ⊃ ∀x.(ϕ(bx
2
c) ⊃ ϕ(x)) ⊃ ∀x.ϕ(x)
For any of these axioms AX and a set of formulae Φ, we denote by
Φ-AX the set of axiom instances when the formula ϕ is in Φ.
Henceforth we assume the calculus LK 2 is enriched with initial
sequents for (all instantiations by terms of) any axioms under con-
sideration and also the usual designated rules for the bounded quan-
tifiers. If we are working in theories containing IND or PIND ,
then we assume proofs are formulated with their associated infer-
ence rules, cf. [25]. We will also have a proof-theoretic treatment of
comprehension in the form of witnessing theorems, which we will
present in Sects. 3.2 and 4.3.
The following result is, in fact, a corollary of what is usually
called ‘free-cut elimination’ introduced by Takeuti in [30], which is
discussed in detail in [12], although we state essentially the version
from [13].
Theorem 5 (Free-cut elimination). Let S be a sequent system con-
taining LK 2 and possibly containing non-logical initial sequents
and induction rules that are closed under substitution of terms for
free variables. Every S-theorem ϕ has an S-proof where each for-
mula occurring is (a substitutional instance of) a subformula of ϕ,
an induction formula, or a formula in an initial sequent.
An important point is that the above statement also holds for
intuitionistic theories (e.g. as stated in [12]).
Definition 6. The theory U i2 is axiomatised by BASIC , ΣB0 -CA
and ΣBi -PIND . V
i
2 is the same but with IND in place of PIND .
We now present a translation 〈·〉 of closed ΣB0 -formulae to
quasipolynomial-size propositional formulae, where set symbols
are associated with propositional variables, essentially from [27].
Let v(t) denote the numerical value of a closed term t.
Definition 7 (PW for closed formulae). We define a translation 〈·〉
of closed ΣB0 -formulae as follows,
〈>〉 := >
〈⊥〉 := ⊥
〈X(t)〉 := pXv(t)
〈s ./ t〉 := ‡
〈ϕ ? ψ〉 := 〈ϕ〉 ? 〈ψ〉
〈∃x ≤ t.ϕ(x)〉 :=
v(t)∨
k=0
〈ϕ(k)〉
〈∀x ≤ t.ϕ(x)〉 :=
v(t)∧
k=0
〈ϕ(k)〉
for ./ ∈ {≤,=} and ? ∈ {∨,∧,⊃}, where ‡ is > if v(s) ./ v(t)
and ⊥ otherwise.
8 Such an X would formally have s in superscript, i.e. written Xs, in [25].
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The following result can essentially be found in, e.g. [25] or
[13], but the initial idea was due to Paris and Wilkie [27].
Theorem 8 (PW for proofs). A V 02 (or U02 ) proof of a Π1-sentence
∀~x.ϕ(~x) can be translated to quasipolynomial-size bounded-depth
LK -proofs of 〈ϕ(~n)〉~n∈N|~x| .
In this paper we will be interested in adapting an extension of
this result due to Krajı́cek, for U12 .
2.3 Monotone and normal proofs in deep inference
The setting we use is due to Brünnler and McKinley [5] [26],
and independently Jeřábek [22]: tree-like MLK proofs can be
represented as term rewriting derivations in the following system,9
w↑ : ϕ→ >
w↓ : ⊥ → ϕ
c↑ : ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ϕ
c↓ : ϕ ∨ ϕ→ ϕ
s : ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ χ
(1)
modulo associativity and commutativity of ∧ and ∨ and the equa-
tions A ∧ > = A = A ∨ ⊥, > ∨> = > and ⊥ ∧⊥ = ⊥.
Definition 9 (Normal proofs). A normal monotone proof is one
where all ↑-steps occur before all ↓-steps.
Notation 10. We denote by MON the rewriting system in (1) above
and by NOR the set of all normal monotone proofs.
For the sake of reducing prerequisites, we deal with MON and
NOR in this paper rather than explicitly defining the associated deep
inference proof systems, KS+ and KS respectively.
In what follows we give a deep inference style presentation of
rewriting derivations, first appearing in [20], in order to aid the
analysis of normalisation complexity later on, e.g. in Sect. 3.
Definition 11 (Derivations). We define derivations (or proofs), and
premiss and conclusion functions, pr and cn resp., inductively:
• Each formula ϕ is a derivation with premiss and conclusion ϕ.
• For derivations π1, π2 and ? ∈ {∧,∨}, π1 ? π2 is a derivation
with premiss pr(π1) ? pr(π2) and conclusion cn(π1) ? cn(π2).
• If cn(π1) → pr(π2) an instance of a rule ρ then
π1
ρ
π2
is a
derivation with premiss pr(π1) and conclusion cn(π2).
If π is a derivation where all inference steps are instances of rules
in a system P with premiss ϕ, conclusion ψ, we write
ϕ
π P
ψ
.
We now introduce a certain geometric abstraction of derivations,
called atomic flows. They were first introduced in [19], and the
complexity of certain transformations were studied in [15]. They
can be thought of as specialised versions of Buss’ flow graphs [11].
Definition 12 (Atomic flows). The (atomic) flow of a MON deriva-
tion is the (directed) graph obtained by tracing the paths of all
atoms, designating nodes at w↓, w↑, c↓ and c↑ steps.
Below we give an example of a MON-derivation and its associ-
ated flow,10 using colours to associate variable occurrences in the
9 Strictly speaking, this is not a term rewriting system (TRS) due to the fact
that the LHS of c↑ and w↑ is just a variable, but the notions of reduction,
derivation etc. otherwise remain the same as for a TRS.
10 In this derivation we also make use of the medial rule, given by m :
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)∨ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)→ (ϕ1 ∨ ψ1)∧ (ϕ2 ∨ ψ2), to show how c↑ and
c↓ steps can be reduced to atomic form.
proof with edges in the flow:
p
c↑ −−−−−
p ∧ p
∨
⊥
w↑ −−
p
c↑ −−−−−
p ∧ p
m −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
p ∨ p
c↓ −−−−−
p
= −−−−−−−−−−
p ∨
⊥
w↓ −−
q
∧
p ∨ p
c↓ −−−−−
p
s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
p
c↑ −−−−−
p ∧ p
∨
q ∧
p
w↑ −−
⊤
= −−−−−−−−−−
q
(2)
Using flows, normalisation of monotone proofs can be con-
ducted in an entirely ‘syntax-free’ way [19]. In particular we have
the following complexity bound from [15].
Theorem 13. A MON proof π can be transformed into a NOR proof
with the same premiss and conclusion in time polynomial in the
number of maximal paths in the flow of π.
In this work it will suffice to estimate the number of paths by
the following very simple upper bound:
Fact 14. The number of maximal paths in a flow of length l is≤ 2l.
3. Monotone theories and translations
We first define some simple positive versions of the theoriesU i2 and
V i2 , before considering certain extensions later, cf. [9].
Definition 15 (Positive classes and theories). ΣB,+i ,Π
B,+
i are the
classes of positive ΣBi and Π
B
i formulae, resp. The theories MU
i
2
and MV i2 are defined as U i2 and V i2 , resp., but with induction and
comprehension formulae required to be positive.
An important observation is that the usual argument proving
U02 = V
0
2 , i.e. that ΣB0 -PIND can simulate ΣB0 -IND , cf. [9],
cannot be carried out in the monotone setting due to the use of
⊃ symbols in that argument.
3.1 Strengthening by generalisations of comprehension
A problem with the theories defined above is that they are rather
weak. Usually, the presence of induction in, say, U12 allows one
to ‘iterate’ comprehension to express more predicates. However,
to prove this, we require a certain amount of negation, even if the
final predicates are themselves positive. We address this problem
by introducing the iterated comprehension axiom, and this will be
later justified by a converse result from Sect. 4.3.
In the definition below, we assume we the presence of a pairing
function allowing us to express sets of tuples [25] [13]. Here, we
write (a, b) ≤ (a′, b′) for a ≤ a′ ∧ b ≤ b′.
Definition 16 (Iterated comprehension). Length iterated compre-
hension, denoted CA|ω|, is the following axiom schema:11
∃X ≤ (~a, b).∀(~x, y) < (~a, b).
y > 0 ⊃
[
X(~x, y) ≡ ϕ
(
~x, y,X
(
−, b y
2
c
))] (3)
CAω is defined as CA|ω| but with (y − 1) in place of b y2 c.
As we mentioned, this form of comprehension is already avail-
able in the presence of ΣB1 -PIND :
Proposition 17. ΣB1 -CA|ω| is provable in U12 .
11 The notation ϕ(X(−)) formally corresponds to the formula ϕ(λ~x.X~x),
where the meta-level λ binder is used for formal abstraction.
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Proof. Let us denote (3) as IH (b) and proceed by induction on b.
For the inductive step, proving IH (2b) from IH (b), we introduce
a set X ′ ≤ (~a, 2b) by ΣB0 -CA such that:
∀(~x, y) < (~a, 2b).[X ′(~x, y) ≡ ϕ(~x, y,X(−, b y
2
c))] (4)
Now, suppose y < b. We have that,
X ′(x, 2y)
←→ ϕ(~x, 2y,X(~t1, y), . . . , X(~tn, y))
←→ ϕ(~x, 2y, ϕ(~t1, y,X(−, b y2 c)), . . . , ϕ(~tn, y,X(−, b
y
2
c)))
←→ ϕ(~x, 2y,X ′(~t1, y), . . . , X ′(~tn, y))
where every occurrence of X in ϕ is indicated in the second line.
The equivalences follow by (4), IH (b) and (4) respectively, and this
finishes the proof of IH (2b). The proof of IH (2b + 1) is similar,
and the base case follows from a single application of CA.
Notice that the above proof is constructive, a useful observation
for when we consider intuitionistic theories in Sect. 4.3.
If ϕ is positive in (3), then we will see that the Paris-Wilkie
translation can be adapted to find monotone propositional formu-
lae witnessing this existential. Consequently, we consider theories
obtained by adding ΣB,+0 -CA|ω| to MU
1
2 and MV 12.
Notation 18. We write MU12 for MU
0
2 + Σ
B,+
0 -CA|ω|, MV
0.5
2
for MV 02 + Σ
B,+
0 -CA|ω| and MV
1
2 for MV
0
2 + Σ
B,+
0 -CAω .
These theories are not conservative extensions, but we justify
this notation by Prop. 17 above and the converse results in Sect. 4.3.
3.2 Witnessing set existentials by SO terms: part I
Second-order theories are often hasslesome for the Paris-Wilkie
translation since it is not clear how to handle set quantifiers. They
are often translated by extension variables, e.g. in [25], although
these may introduce negation in the propositional translation.12
For this reason we develop an appropriate term language for
comprehension and thus eliminate occurrences of existential set
quantifiers altogether. This result scales up to our intuitionistic
theories later on, albeit with additional complications, which is
helpful since notions of quantifier complexity beyond ΣB0 are not
well-defined in intuitionistic versions of arithmetic.
Definition 19 (Comprehension terms). We extendL2 by SO terms,{
~a < ~t : ϕ
}
and Tϕ,~t
parametrised by FO terms ~t, variables ~a and formulae ϕ.
Φ-CT is the set of initial double-sequents,
~x ∈
{
~a < ~t : ϕ(~a)
}
←→ ~x < ~t ∧ ϕ(~x)
for each ϕ ∈ Φ, and Φ-CT |ω| is the set of initial double-sequents,
Tϕ,~s,t(~x, y)←→ y > 0 ∧ (~x, y) < (~s, t) ∧ ϕ(Tϕ,~s,t(−, b y2 c))
Intuitively, the initial sequents for CT |ω| evaluates the fixed
point defined by the comprehension formula. It is not difficult to
see that, over any SO theory, we have the following results:
Lemma 20. Φ-CT , Φ-CT |ω| and Φ-CTω conservatively extend
Φ-CA, Φ-CA|ω| and Φ-CAω resp.
Theorem 21. ΣB,+0 theorems of MU
1
2, MV
0.5
2 and MV
1
2 have
proofs containing only ΣB,+0 -formulae, using CT |ω|, CT |ω| and
CTω resp. instead of CA.
Proof. Follows from free-cut elimination, Thm. 5, and Lemma 20
above, replacing existentially quantified set variables by terms.
12 Intuitively, one expects that this negation can be eliminated, but existing
versions of free-cut elimination, e.g. from [13], do not quite yield this.
Finally, we can extend the Paris-Wilkie translation of closed
formulae to account for comprehension terms.
Definition 22 (PW for comprehension terms). We define:〈
~s ∈
{
~a < ~t : ϕ
}〉
:=
〈
~s < ~t
〉
∧ 〈ϕ(~s)〉〈
Tϕ,~s,t(~r, u)
〉
:= 〈~r ≤ ~s〉 ∧ 〈u < t〉 ∧
〈
ϕ(Tϕ,~s,t(−, bu2 c))
〉
Notice that the case of CT |ω| computes the fixed point of ϕ by
a monotone propositional formula of low complexity:
Fact 23. 〈Tϕ,~a,b(~s, t)〉 has polylogarithmic depth and quasipoly-
nomial size in v(~s), v(t), for CT |ω|.
Using CT |ω| we can, for example, express the threshold func-
tions from [1], [2] [8] [16]:
th(x, a, 0) ←→ x = 0 ∨ (x = 1 ∧ a ∈ X)
th(x, a, b) ←→ ∃y ≤ x.
(
th(y, a, b b
2
c)
∧ th(x− y, a+ b b
2
c, d b
2
e)
)
Clearly, there are simple propositional proofs of the PW trans-
lations of the initial sequents from CT and CT |ω|.
3.3 Paris-Wilkie translation for monotone theories
We present a version of the Paris-Wilkie translation from our mono-
tone theories to deep inference derivations, focussing on the length
of the atomic flows obtained to derive complexity bounds for NOR
later on. A minor contribution to the literature here is our presenta-
tion of the Paris-Wilkie translation in deep inference style, thanks
in large part to insights from previous works, e.g. [5] [22] [16].
First, let us extend 〈·〉 to the LHS and RHS of sequents. We
define 〈Γ〉l as
∧
ϕ∈Γ
〈ϕ〉 and 〈Γ〉r as
∨
ϕ∈Γ
〈ϕ〉.
Definition 24 (PW for proofs). We extend the translation 〈·〉 to
proofs π(~x) in MV 0.52 or MU
1
2 of a Σ
B,+
0 sequent Γ(~x)→ ∆(~x),
mapping to derivations
〈Γ(~n)〉l
〈π(~n)〉 MON
〈∆(~n)〉r
for ~n ∈ N|~x|, by induction on
the number of inference steps in π(~x).
The most significant step, from the point of view of complexity
is if a proof π(a) extended by an induction step:
Γ, ϕ(a)→ ϕ(a+ 1),∆
IND
Γ, ϕ(0)→ ϕ(t),∆
This is translated to the following derivation:
〈Γ〉
l
c↑ −−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈ϕ (0)〉
= −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
c↑ −−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈Γ〉
l
∧
〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈ϕ (0)〉
〈π(0)〉
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
〈ϕ (1)〉 ∨ 〈∆〉
r
s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
c↑ −−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈Γ〉
l
∧



〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈ϕ (1)〉
〈π(1)〉
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
〈ϕ (2)〉 ∨ 〈∆〉
r
∨ 〈∆〉
r



s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−...
...
...
s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
∧



〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈ϕ (t− 2)〉
〈π(t−2)〉
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
〈ϕ (t− 1)〉 ∨ 〈∆〉
r
∨
〈∆〉
r
∨ 〈∆〉
r
c↓ −−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈∆〉
r



s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈Γ〉
l
∧ 〈ϕ (t− 1)〉
〈π(t−1)〉
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
〈ϕ (t)〉 ∨ 〈∆〉
r
∨
〈∆〉
r
∨ 〈∆〉
r
c↓ −−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈∆〉
r
= −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈ϕ (t)〉 ∨
〈∆〉
r
∨ 〈∆〉
r
c↓ −−−−−−−−−−−−−
〈∆〉
r
〈Γ〉l 〈ϕ(0)〉
〈π(0)〉
〈π(1)〉
...
...
...
〈π(t− 2)〉
〈π(t− 1)〉
〈ϕ(t)〉 〈∆〉r
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By following the path of the induction formula (in orange),
notice that this multiplies the length of flow by v(t), a possibly
quasipolynomial factor. The case for PIND is analogous to IND ,
but crucially the length of flow is only multiplied by dlog v(t)e, a
logarithmic factor.
A proof π(a) extended by a ∀-r step,
Γ, a ≤ t→ ∆, ϕ(a)
∀-r
Γ→ ∆, ∀x ≤ t.ϕ(x)
is translated to the derivation below,
〈Γ〉l
c↑
〈Γ〉l ∧ · · · ∧ 〈Γ〉l
∧
>
=
> ∧ · · · ∧ >
=
〈Γ〉l ∧ 〈0 ≤ t〉
〈π(0)〉
〈∆〉r ∨ 〈ϕ(0)〉
∧ · · · ∧
〈Γ〉l ∧ 〈v(t) ≤ t〉
〈π(t)〉
〈∆〉r ∨ 〈ϕ(t)〉
s
〈∆〉r ∨ · · · ∨ 〈∆〉r
c↓
〈∆〉r
∨
v(t)∧
k=0
〈ϕ(k)〉
〈Γ〉l
· · · v(t) · · ·
〈π(0)〉 · · · 〈π(t)〉
· · ·
· · ·
〈∆〉r
· · ·
v(t)∧
k=0
〈φ(k)〉
where we notice that 〈n ≤ t〉 is> for all n ≤ v(t). With regards to
the length of the flow, besides that inherited from each π(i), notice
that the v(t) c↑ nodes at the top (for each atom occurrence in 〈Γ〉l)
can be implemented by a complete (almost) balanced tree of depth
dlog v(t)e, and similarly for the c↓ nodes corresponding to 〈∆〉r .
A proof π extended by a ∃-r step,
Γ→ ∆, ϕ(s)
∃-r
Γ, s ≤ t→ ∆,∃x ≤ t.ϕ(x)
is translated to the derivation below,
〈Γ〉l ∧ >
=
〈Γ〉l
〈π〉〈∆〉r ∨ 〈ϕ(s)〉w↓ v(t)∨
k=0
〈ϕ(k)〉

〈Γ〉l
〈π〉
〈∆〉r
v(t)∨
k=0
〈φ(k)〉
assuming v(s) ≤ v(t), and so 〈s ≤ t〉 is >. Otherwise 〈s ≤ t〉 is
⊥ and the derivation is just composed of several w↑ and w↓ steps.
The composition of two proofs by cut is translated as follows:
π1
Γ→ ∆, ϕ
π2
Σ, ϕ→ Π
cut
Γ,Σ→ ∆,Π
 
〈Γ〉l
〈π1〉
〈∆〉r ∨ 〈ϕ〉
∧ 〈Σ〉l
s
〈∆〉r ∨
〈ϕ〉 ∧ 〈Σ〉l
〈π2〉
〈Π〉r
This can be seen as a simpler version of the translation of an
induction step, where the length of flows is increased by only a
constant factor rather than a logarithmic factor.
In a similar way, the translations of ∨ and ∧ steps are simpler
versions of ∃ and ∀ steps, respectively, increasing flow length by at
most addition of a constant rather than addition of a logarithm.
Finally, the translation of structural steps affect length of a flow
by at most addition of a constant. The case for weakening, w-l
and w-r, can also be seen as a simpler version of the case for ∃-r
above. For instance, a proof π extended by a c-r step is translated
as follows,
π
Γ→ ∆, ϕ, ϕ
c-r
Γ→ ∆, ϕ
 
〈Γ〉l
〈π〉
〈∆〉r ∨
〈ϕ〉 ∨ 〈ϕ〉
c↓
〈ϕ〉
whence the case for c-l is dual.
A routine complexity analysis gives us the following:
Theorem 25. If MV 0.52 proves a Σ
B,+
0 sequent Γ(~x) → ∆(~x),
there are derivations
〈Γ(~n)〉l
MON
〈∆(~n)〉r
of size quasipolynomial in ~n ∈ N|~x|.
3.4 〈·〉 on MU12 normalises in quasipolynomial time
As we mentioned, 〈·〉 on PIND-steps multiplies the length of a
flow by a polylogarithmic factor, due to the divide-and-conquer
format of the induction.
Lemma 26. 〈·〉 on MU12 proofs induces atomic flows of polyloga-
rithmic length.
We can now apply the normalisation result, Thm. 13, and
Fact 14 to obtain one of our main results:
Theorem 27. If MU12 proves a Σ
B,+
0 sequent Γ(~x) → ∆(~x),
there are derivations
〈Γ(~n)〉l
NOR
〈∆(~n)〉r
of size quasipolynomial in ~n ∈ N|~x|.
4. Intuitionistic theories and translations
Unfortunately, the monotone setting in arithmetic does not allow us
to readily conduct metalogical reasoning, and so it does not seem
possible to prove soundness results (or ‘reflection’ principles).
Therefore we introduce an intuitionistic hierarchy of theories
in which to conduct such reasoning. The idea here is to view
intuitionistic implication under the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov
interpretation, as a “transformation of proofs”. In this way we
can extend the PW-translation to deal with implication without
breaking monotonicity.13
Remark 28. Previous work on intuitionistic bounded arithmetic
has included only positive induction for versions of Buss’ theory
S2 [10] [14], in order to conduct realizability arguments. In those
settings one can, in fact, simulate the full power of non-positive
induction, but it is not possible in our setting due to the presence of
set symbols.
4.1 The hierarchy of type levels in intuitionistic logic
In order to simplify the definition of a higher type Paris-Wilkie
translation later on, here we only work with formulae that are
(∀,∧,⊃)-combinations of ΣB,+0 -formulae, as is common in realiz-
ability and Dialectica style interpretations. Disjunction and existen-
tials, as expected, cause genuine difficulties that are cumbersome to
deal with, cf. Sect. 6.4. Nonetheless, we point out that this fragment
suffices to prove the various results in the converse direction that
we seek, in particular Thm. 49, and so we still attain the required
correspondence for this theory of arithmetic.
Definition 29 (Levels). DefineL0 to be the set of positive formulae
(of ‘type level 0’). For j > 0 we define Lj as follows:
• If ϕ ∈ Lj−1 then ϕ ∈ Lj .
13 Such an approach is not generally available in classical logic due to De
Morgan laws, which induce a collapse of negation to the atoms.
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• If ϕ ∈ Lj−1 and ψ ∈ Lj then ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ Lj .
• If ϕ ∈ Lj and ψ ∈ Lj then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Lj .
• If ϕ ∈ Lj then ∀x ≤ t.ϕ ∈ Lj .
The set of bounded formulae of level j,Lj∩ΣB0 , is denoted Σ
B,Lj
0 .
We write ΣB,Lj1 for the set of formulae ∃ ~X ≤ ~t.ϕ, for ϕ ∈ Σ
B,Lj
0 .
We write LjJ and LjK to denote the fragments of LJ and LK ,
respectively, consisting of only (propositional) Lj formulae.
Henceforth, let us assume that theories are based over intuition-
istic logic, unless otherwise mentioned.
Definition 30 (Intuitionistic theories). For i = 0, 1 define the
theory IjU i2 as U i2 but with induction formulae in Σ
B,Lj
i and
comprehension formulae in ΣB,+0 .
Remark 31 (Quantifiers in intuitionistic logic). There is no canoni-
cal notion of quantifier hierarchy in intuitionistic logic, namely due
to the lack of a general prenex normal form for formulae. Vari-
ous hierarchies have been proposed for intuitionistic versions of
bounded arithmetic, e.g. in [10] [21] in order to mimic associated
complexity hierarchies, but this is beyond the scope of this work.
We point out that the notion of bounded formulae, ΣB0 , remains
the same in both the classical setting and the intuitionistic setting.
Our notion of ΣB,Lj1 is in the ‘strict’ sense of [13], and we will later
eliminate these existentials altogether in favour of a formulation
using set terms, as in Sect. 3.2, allowing us to remain amongst ΣB0
formulae where quantifier behaviour is more robust.
4.2 On the relative strength of theories
In this section we address the relative strength of our intuitionistic
theories with the positive theories defined earlier, as well as their
more well known classical versions.
From [10] we have that the law of excluded middle holds for all
quantifier-free formulae free of set symbols already in IS2, and so
also I0U02 , which helps prove some of the results here:
Proposition 32 (Classical reasoning). If U02 ` ϕ and ϕ is free of
quantifiers and set symbols then I0U02 ` ϕ.
By inspection of the rules, or by alluding to a multiple conclu-
sion version of the intuitionistic calculus (e.g. from [18]), notice
that there are only two rules of LK 2 that cannot be simulated by
LJ 2:⊃-r and ∀-r. In particular this yields the following, which was
observed in [4]:
Proposition 33. The positive propositional fragments MLJ and
MLK of LJ and LK resp. polynomially simulate each other.
Both ⊃-r and ∀-r require restriction of one formula on the right
to be intuitionistically valid. While the former is an inherently non-
constructive principle, the latter, which is freely available in MU i2
and MV i2, can be simulated by an induction argument:
Proposition 34. I1U12 ` ∀x ≤ t.(ϕ(x) ∨ ψ) → (∀x ≤ t.ϕ(x) ∨
ψ), where ϕ and ψ are ΣB,+0 and x does not occur free in ψ.
Proof. We reason inside the theory I1U12 and prove the following
L1 formula by polynomial induction on y:
∀y.∀x ≤ (t− y).
[
∀z ∈ [x, x+ y).(ϕ(z) ∨ ψ)
⊃ ∀z ∈ [x, x+ y).ϕ(z) ∨ ψ)
]
(5)
Let χ(x, y) be such that the formula (5) is ∀y.∀x ≤ (t −
y).χ(x, y). The base case, when y = 0, is simple since the quan-
tifiers in χ(x, y) collapse to enforcing z = x, whence χ(x, y) is
equivalent to the identity formula (ϕ(x) ∨ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ(x) ∨ ψ).
Now assume, for some b, we have that ∀x ≤ (t−b).χ(x, b), and
let a ≤ (t−2b). We will attempt to show that χ(a, 2b). Notice that
from a ≤ (t−2b) we have that a ≤ (t−b) and (a+b) ≤ (t−b), by
classical reasoning and Prop. 32 above. Therefore, by the inductive
hypothesis we have that χ(a, b) and χ(a+ b, b).
Now, let us assume the antecedent, say χ1(a, 2b), of χ(a, 2b),
i.e. ∀z ∈ [a, a + 2b).(ϕ(z) ∨ ψ), and attempt to deduce the
succedent, sayχ2(a, 2b), i.e. ∀z ∈ [a, a+2b).ϕ(z)∨ψ. Notice that,
due to the intuitionistic setting, we cannot at this point query the
universal quantifier occurring in the succedent since it is underneath
a disjunction. Instead, again by Prop. 32, we have:
c ∈ [a, a+ 2b) ≡ c ∈ [a, a+ b) ∨ c ∈ [a+ b, a+ 2b) (6)
Consequently, by the right-left direction of 6 above, from χ1(a, 2b)
we can deduce ∀z ∈ [a, a+b).(ϕ(z)∨ψ) and ∀z ∈ [a+b, a+2b),
i.e. χ1(a, b) and χ1(a+ b, b).(ϕ(z) ∨ ψ).
Finally, since we already have χ(a, b) and χ(a+ b, b) from the
inductive hypothesis, we can conclude χ2(a, b) and χ2(a + b, b).
From here we can apply the left-right direction of (6) along with
basic logical manipulations to obtain χ2(a, 2b) as required.
The inductive step for y = 2b + 1 is similar. The theorem now
follows from (5) by setting y = t and conducting basic logical
manipulations.
From here we arrive at a useful normal form for our higher-type
Paris-Wilkie translation later on:
Corollary 35. Every ΣB,+0 -formula is equivalent in I1U
1
2 to one
in prenex normal form.
The usual simulation of propositional MLK in propositional
LJ , i.e. Prop. 33, is carried over by converting the succedents of
MLK -sequents to disjunctions of their formulae. We just showed,
in Prop. 34 above, that this approach also admits simulation of the
∀-r rule once L1-PIND is available.
The intuitionistic formulations of induction rules, with no side-
formulae on the right, turn out to have equal strength to their
classical formulations, by a routine argument. Furthermore, we can
observe that the usual argument simulating IND from PIND , e.g.
from [12] or [9], is constructive and requires only an increase by 1
in the type-level of induction formulae:
Proposition 36. ΣB,Lj+10 -PIND proves Σ
B,Lj
0 -IND , for j ≥ 0.
Finally, since the proof of Prop. 17 is constructive, we have:
Proposition 37. ΣB1 -CA|ω| is provable in I1U12 .
Proof. Only ΣB,L11 -PIND is used in the proof of Prop. 17.
We can now conclude the following.
Theorem 38 (Inclusions). I0U12 ⊆MU12 ⊆MV
0.5
2 ⊆ I1U
1
2 .
Proof. The first two inclusions are routine. The final inclusion
follows from Props. 33, 34, 36 and 37.
4.3 Witnessing set existentials by SO terms: part II
For the same reasons as Sect. 3.2, and the difficulty of handling
quantifiers in intuitionistic logic, we wish to eliminate occurrences
of second-order quantification in our intuitionistic theories. The
arguments are a little more involved now that we have access to
induction on more complex formulae, but we are nonetheless able
to work with the same comprehension terms and rules as before.
We will assume that every ΣB,Lj1 formula has just one second-
order existential quantifier.14 Our main witnessing lemma is the
following:
14 This can be achieved by the usual trick of string interleaving, cf. [13].
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Lemma 39. Suppose j > 0 and IjU12 ` Γ(~a, ~A)→ ∃X.ϕ(X,~a, ~A),
where all free variables are indicated. Then there is a ΣB,+0 -CT |ω|
term T (~a, ~A) such that IjU12 ` Γ(~a, ~A)→ ϕ(T (~a, ~A),~a, ~A).
Proof sketch. By induction on the number of inference steps in a
free-cut free proof π. The only problematic case is when π consists
of a subproof π′ followed by a PIND step,
Γ, ∃X ≤ s.ϕ(X, ba
2
c)→ ∃X ≤ s.ϕ(X, a)
PIND
Γ, ∃X ≤ s.ϕ(X, 0)→ ∃X ≤ s.ϕ(X, t)
with free variables amongst ~a, ~A. We then have a proof of,
Γ, A ≤ s, ϕ(A, ba
2
c)→ ∃X.ϕ(X, a)
from which we have a term R(A) (with free variables from ~a, ~A),
by the inductive hypothesis, and a proof π′(A) of:
Γ, A ≤ s, ϕ(A, ba
2
c)→ R(A) ≤ s ∧ ϕ(R(A), a)
Now, by ΣB,+0 -CT |ω|, we have a term TR,s,a and initial sequents:
TR,s,a(x, y)←→ y > 0∧(x, y) < (s, a)∧R(TR,s,a(−, b y2 c))(x)
Finally, we can apply PIND after π′(TR,s,a) to obtain a proof
of the required format.
From here we can obtain our quantifier-elimination result:
Theorem 40. For j > 0, IjU12 is equivalent to IjU02 +ΣB,+0 -CT |ω|
over ΣB,+0 -theorems.
Proof. Since the proof of Prop. 17 can be made constructive in
I1U
1
2 , and so the theorem follows from Lemma 39 above.
Notation 41. Following the shorthands from Sect. 3, we will write
¯
IjU
1
2 for IjU
0
2 + Σ
B,+
0 -CT |ω|, ¯
IjV
0.5
2 for IjV
0
2 + Σ
B,+
0 -CT |ω|
and
¯
IjV
1
2 for IjV
0
2 + Σ
B,+
0 -CTω .
4.4 Paris-Wilkie translation for IjU12 and IjV 12
For convenience we will switch back to the sequent calculus pre-
sentation of monotone proofs, MLK , whose tree-like variant is
polynomially equivalent to MON [22]. It is just as simple to conduct
the translation to MON, but already existing concepts and terminol-
ogy for the sequent calculus makes it slightly easier to explain the
translation; in particular, the existence of a sequent arrow (→) at
the meta-level makes it simple to translate implications between
monotone formulae to monotone sequents.
This way, it will also be clearer from our translation how to
obtain a correspondence for dag-like MLK , for which there is no
standard definition of a corresponding system based on MON.
As expected for realizability-style translations, it is contractive
behaviour that generates complexity, this time in the dependency
graph of a dag-like MLK proof. However, the length of this graph
is tamed just like in Sect. 3.4, by relying on PIND .
Definition 42 (Formula and sequent translation). Set ⟪·⟫0 = 〈·〉,
and for j > 0, we define a translation ⟪·⟫j from closed boundedLj
formulae to multisets of propositional Lj−1 sequents as follows:
• If ϕ ∈ Lj−1 then, ⟪ϕ⟫j := { → 〈ϕ〉}
• If ϕ ∈ Lj−1 and ψ ∈ Lj then:
⟪ϕ ⊃ ψ⟫j :=
{
〈ϕ〉 ,Γ→ ∆ : Γ→ ∆ ∈ ⟪ψ⟫j
}
• If ϕ,ψ ∈ Lj then ⟪ϕ ∧ ψ⟫j := ⟪ϕ⟫j ∪ ⟪ψ⟫j .
• If ϕ ∈ Lj then ⟪∀x ≤ t.ϕ(x)⟫j :=
v(t)⋃
k=0
⟪ϕ(k)⟫j .
• For a cedent Γ of Lj formulae, ⟪Γ⟫ := ⋃
ϕ∈Γ
⟪ϕ⟫j .
In what follows, we will use S and its decorations to vary over
sequents, and we write
~S
π
S
for a (dag-like) sequent derivation called
π with premisses the (multi)set or list ~S and conclusion S.
Before proceeding to give the generalised Paris-Wilkie transla-
tion of IjU12 proofs, we first give a version of the deduction theorem
that will be useful, e.g. for the ⊃-r case in our translation.
Lemma 43 (Deduction). An LjJ derivation
→ ϕ
π
→ ψ
can be polyno-
mially transformed to an LjJ proof π′ of ϕ→ ψ, and vice-versa.
Proof. The right-left direction is simply obtained by cutting→ ϕ
against the conclusion ϕ → ψ of π′. For the left-right direction,
we append the cedent ϕ to the left-hand side of all sequents oc-
curring in the derivation π:
ϕ→ ϕ
ϕ,π
ϕ→ ψ
. It is not difficult to see that
the derivation remains valid in LjJ and, moreover, begins with a
correct initial sequent.
Definition 44 (Translation of proofs). For j > 0, an
¯
IjU
1
2 or
¯
IjV
0.5
2 proof π of a sequent Σ → ϕ is translated by ⟪·⟫j to a
multiset of (dag-like) Lj−1J derivations of the following format: ⟪Σ⟫
j
⟪π⟫jS
S
: S ∈ ⟪ϕ⟫j

The translation is again by induction on the structure of an
arithmetic proof π. We give some key steps in the translation below,
henceforth fixing j and suppressing it in superscripts.
If π consists of subproofs π1 and π2 followed by a cut step,
Σ→ ϕ Π, ϕ→ ψ
cut
Π,Σ→ ψ
then by the inductive hypothesis we have derivations
⟪Σ⟫
⟪π1⟫S
S
for
each S ∈ ⟪ϕ⟫, and derivations
⟪Π⟫
⟪ϕ⟫
⟪π2⟫S′
S′
for each S′ ∈ ⟪ψ⟫. Let
⟪ϕ⟫ = {Si : i ≤ n} and, for each S′ ∈ ⟪ψ⟫, we define,
⟪π⟫S′ :=
⟪Π⟫
⟪Σ⟫
⟪π1⟫S0
S0
⟪π1⟫S1
...
⟪π1⟫Sn
Sn
⟪π2⟫S′
S′
where ⟪Σ⟫ is used once for each ⟪π1⟫Si .
If π consists of a subproof π′ followed by a c-l step,
Γ, ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
c-l
Γ, ϕ→ ψ
then, for S ∈ ⟪ψ⟫, ⟪π⟫S is defined as ⟪π′⟫S , deleting one of the
occurrences of each formula χ in ⟪ϕ⟫; from the point of view of
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the dependency graph, any later sequents previously relying on the
deleted occurrence now rely on the remaining occurrence of χ.
If a proof π consists of a subproof π′ followed by a ⊃-r step,
Σ, ϕ→ ψ
⊃-r
Σ→ ϕ ⊃ ψ
then, again, notice that ϕ must be in Lj−1, since ϕ ⊃ ψ must be
in Lj . Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, we have derivations
⟪Σ⟫
→ 〈ϕ〉
⟪π′⟫
S
S
for each S ∈ ⟪ψ⟫. From here, we can obtain a
definition of ⟪π⟫S of the appropriate format by simply applying
the deduction theorem, Lemma 43.
If π consists of subproofs π1 and π2 followed by a ⊃-l step,
Σ→ ϕ Π, ψ → χ
⊃-l
Π, ϕ ⊃ ψ,Σ→ χ
then notice thatϕmust beLj−1, sinceϕ ⊃ ψmust be inLj . There-
fore, by the inductive hypothesis, we have a derivation
⟪Σ⟫
⟪π1⟫ϕ
→ 〈ϕ〉
and derivations
⟪Π⟫
⟪ψ⟫
⟪π2⟫S
S
for each S ∈ ⟪χ⟫.
Let ⟪ψ⟫ = {Γi → ∆i : i ≤ n} and, for S ∈ ⟪χ⟫, we define,
⟪π⟫S :=
⟪Π⟫
〈ϕ〉 ,Γ0 → ∆0
⟪ϕ⊃ψ⟫
〈ϕ〉 ,Γn → ∆n
⟪Σ⟫
⟪π1⟫ϕ
→ 〈ϕ〉
Γ0 → ∆0
cut
Γn → ∆n
⟪π2⟫S
S
where the sequence of formulae marked cut is obtained by cutting
the sequent→ 〈ϕ〉 against each 〈ϕ〉 ,Γi → ∆i in ⟪ϕ ⊃ ψ⟫.
The ∀ rules are rather simple. The rule ∀-l amounts to adding
further premisses to an existing derivation, while ∀-r essentially
follows from expanding out the definition of ⟪·⟫ on universally
quantified formulae.
For the extension of a proof by an induction step, the defini-
tion of ⟪·⟫ is obtained by first converting the induction into finitely
many instances of cut (the number determined by the value of the
closed term in the succedent of the lower sequent), like in the defi-
nition of 〈·〉, and then applying the definition of ⟪·⟫ for the case of
cut steps. This may increase the length of the dependency graph by
a logarithmic factor in the case of
¯
IjU
1
2, and by a quasipolynomial
factor in the case of
¯
IjV
0.5
2 .
It turns out that the image of
¯
IjU
1
2 proofs can be made tree-
like in quasipolynomial time. We omit a complexity analysis here,
for brevity, but remark that the argument is not dissimilar to that
for 〈·〉 on MU02 and its variations. Essentially, the length of the
dependency graph of an Lj−1J proof in the image of ⟪·⟫j is
bounded by a polylogarithm in the size of the arguments in the
conclusion, due to the use of only polynomial induction steps, and
so ‘unwinding’ the proof to tree-like form takes quasipolynomial-
time. The argument also bears semblance to that used in [25] for
the theory U11 (or equivalently U12 ), where it is extension variables
rather than dagness that needs to be unwound in a proof.
Theorem 45 (Complexity of ⟪·⟫). If
¯
IjV
0.5
2 proves an Lj sequent
Σ(~x) → ϕ(~x), there are Lj−1J derivations
⟪Σ(~n)⟫
π
S
for each
S ∈ ⟪A(~n)⟫ of size quasipolynomial in ~n and, if it is a
¯
IjU
1
2
theorem, π has a dependency graph of length polylogarithmic in ~n.
Finally, by considering the special case when j = 1 and
the aforementioned correspondence between tree-like MLK and
MON, we arrive at one of our main results:
Corollary 46. If I1U12 proves a ΣB,+0 sequent Γ → ∆ then there
are quasipolynomial-size MON proofs
〈Γ〉l
〈∆〉r
, or equivalently tree-
like MLK proofs of 〈Γ〉l → 〈∆〉r .
5. Reflection principles
The reflection principle for a propositional proof system (PPS) is
a formal statement of its soundness. Proofs in arithmetic theories
of such principles serve as converses of propositional translations
(e.g. Paris-Wilkie), since they guarantee that the theory is amongst
the strongest for which such a translation could exist.
Due to the criteria of positivity and level we must be careful
about how to formalise sequences and data structures. Therefore
we take a mixed approach, using individual variables (on which
negation may occur) to code formulae and proofs, as often done
in subsystems of Buss’ S i2 and T i2 , using set variables to code the
truth of the formula, as is usually done for subsystems of U i2 and
V i2 [25]. This is also the reason why we include the # symbol in
all our theories, since it is required to carry out such a coding.15
We do not present the full formalisation here, but assume we
have access to the following ΣB,+0 -formulae free of set variables:
• Fla+(x) : “x codes a positive formula”.
• DerP (x, y, z) : Fla+(y)∧Fla+(z) ∧ “x codes a P -derivation
from y to z”.
We assume that their basic properties are provable in U02 (and so
I0U
0
2 and MU02) cf. [25].
We also need a formula,
Tr+(x) : Fla+(x) ∧ “the formula coded by x is true”
obtained by ΣB,+0 -CA|ω| and so containing set variables. In order
to do this we need to use a monotone variation of Spira’s theorem,
stating that every formula can be polyomially transformed into an
equivalent one that is balanced, i.e. has logarithmic depth.
The exposition follows that in [25], taking care to preserve
monotonicity. For brevity, let us suppose we have such formulae,
and that
〈
Tr+(x)
〉
is logically equivalent to the propositional for-
mula coded by x, witnessed by short proofs in NOR.
Definition 47 (Positive reflection). For a PPS P , we define:
Rfn+P := ∀x, y, z.(DerP (x, y, z) ⊃ (Tr
+(y) ⊃ Tr+(z))) (7)
Recall that a (propositional) monotone implication is a proposi-
tional formula ϕ ⊃ ψ where ϕ and ψ are free of ⊃ symbols.
Proposition 48 (Quasipolynomial simulation). For a PPS P :
1. If MU12 ` Rfn
+
P then NOR quasipolynomially simulates P
over monotone implications.
2. If MV 0.52 ` Rfn
+
P or I1U
1
2 ` Rfn+P then MON quasipolyno-
mially simulates P over monotone implications.
15 We do not lose much, however, since quasipolynomials pop up from
various locations in the propositional translations presented, not just #.
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Proof. Let us consider 1, whence the case for 2 is analogous.
Applying Thm. 2516 we arrive at quasipolynomial-size families of
propositional derivations:〈
DerP (l,m, n) ∧
〈
Tr+(m)
〉〉
π(l,m,n) NOR〈
Tr+(n)
〉
for l,m, n ∈ N. Consider a P -proof πϕ,ψ of a monotone impli-
cation ϕ ⊃ ψ, and let us write pαq for the code of some (finite)
object. Notice that DerP (pπϕ,ψq, pϕq, pψq) is true and contains
no set symbols, so its image under 〈·〉 is simply a Boolean combi-
nation of constant symbols, which can be evaluated even in NOR.
Finally, recall that
〈
Tr+(pχq)
〉
is provably equivalent to χ by short
proofs in NOR, for any positive propositional formula χ, and so
we can construct from π(pπϕ,ψq, pϕq, pψq) quasipolynomial-size
derivations of the format
ϕ
NOR
ψ
as required.
Finally we give the following result which, in light of Prop. 48
above, provides a form of converse to Cor. 46.
Theorem 49. I1U12 proves Rfn+MON.
Proof sketch. We prove the following ΣB,L10 -formula,
∀x, y, z < w.(DerMON(x, y, z) ⊃ (Tr+(y) ⊃ Tr+(z)))
by polynomial induction on w, whence the result follows by
BASIC . In the inductive step we apply the inductive hypothe-
sis to the first half and second half of a MON rewriting derivation,
thence applying cuts to derive the inductive step. In order to con-
struct divide-and-conquer style arguments on MON proofs, we may
represent them as usual rewriting derivations that are simply lists
of formulae (i.e. ‘Calculus of Structures’ style [6]).17
6. Further remarks
We briefly present some further points related to this work and
discuss some ongoing research.
6.1 Variants of V 12
We have discussed mostly the monotone and intuitionistic versions
of U12 and the versions of V 12 with only Σ
B,L1
0 -PIND rather than
ΣB,L10 -IND , our so-called ‘V
0.5
2 ’ theories. We believe that all the
expected results for MV 12 and I1V
1
2 go through, namely that both
translate to dag-like MLK derivations with extension variables,
cf. [24], and the latter is able to prove its soundness.
In a recent line of work by Straßburger et al., variants of KS
(or NOR) with extension have been studied [29], so it would be
interesting to see what blend of rules corresponds to those sys-
tems. The answer does not seem obvious since, as soon as we add
ΣB,L10 -IND we inherit Σ
B,+
0 -IND , and so cannot distinguish nor-
mal proofs from monotone proofs.
6.2 Counting arguments and further reflection principles
It is known that tree-like MLK can quasipolynomially simulate
LK over monotone sequents [1], and this (along with [1] [16] etc.)
is one of the main sources of inspiration for this work.
The proof relies crucially on monotone formulae computing
the threshold function, for which we constructed SO terms at the
16 In the case of 2 we should apply 27 or Cor. 46, as appropriate.
17 This representation is at most quadratically larger than the deep inference
representation of Sect. 2.3.
end of Sect. 3.2. In all these works, the crucial point is to find
short proofs witnessing the symmetry of threshold functions. While
Atserias et al. achieved this for tree-like MLK (or MON), this is
also achievable for NOR, albeit via a more complicated proof, and
this was used in [16] to construct quasipolynomial-size proofs of
the propositional pigeonhole principle in NOR.
To show the usefulness of our monotone theories, in ongoing
work we show that MU12 proves the correctness of merge-sort, and
so can prove the symmetry of threshold functions, subsuming the
results of [16]. We would be interested in taking this further, finding
new upper bounds and separations via these natural theories.
Can we reproduce Atserias et al.’s result using purely logical
tools, instead of complex counting arguments? A corollary of their
result is that the intuitionistic calculus LJ quasipolynomially sim-
ulates LK over monotone sequents. Can we perhaps reproduce this
result or something in between, say for IjU12 for some large but fi-
nite j? A potentially fruitful idea is given in the next subsection; an
answer to this question might have ramifications for more general
questions in monotone proof complexity.
6.3 (∀,⊃)-classical logic and Pierce’s law
There are several difficulties with attempting to extend some of
our results to the classical setting, but such results could provide
a purely logical analogue to results in, say, [2], which rely on
complex combinatorial arguments.
Over the (∀,⊃)-fragment of the language we can recover clas-
sical reasoning by what is known as Pierce’s law:
((ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ϕ) ⊃ ϕ or the rule
Σ, ϕ ⊃ ψ → ϕ
Σ→ ϕ
In fact, when dealing with only L1-proofs, we can actually realize
this law by (tree-like) MLK derivations,
⟪ Σ, ϕ ⊃ ψ → ϕ
Σ→ ϕ
⟫ :
⟪Σ⟫
〈ϕ〉 ,Γ1 → ∆1
⟪ϕ⊃ψ⟫
〈ϕ〉 ,Γn → ∆n
⟪π⟫ϕ
→ 〈ϕ〉
7→
⟪Σ⟫
〈ϕ〉 → 〈ϕ〉
〈ϕ〉 ,Γ1 → ∆1, 〈ϕ〉
w
〈ϕ〉 ,Γn → ∆n, 〈ϕ〉
⟪π⟫ϕ,〈ϕ〉
→ 〈ϕ〉 , 〈ϕ〉
→ 〈ϕ〉
where ⟪π⟫ϕ , 〈ϕ〉 is obtained by appending 〈ϕ〉 to the succedent
of every sequent in ⟪π⟫ϕ. Notice that, while this transformation
is valid in MLK it is not, in general, valid for LjJ due to the
restriction on the ⊃-r rule.
The problem with implementing this is the fact that we do not
have much control on the logical complexity of ψ. Nonetheless, in
ongoing work we are exploring fragments of classicalU12 for which
a translation to MLK may still be attained.
6.4 Disjunction in the intuitionistic setting
We have not dealt with disjunction in the intuitionistic setting in
favour of easing the translation. As one might expect, things be-
come very cumbersome, with particular complications arising since
our base type includes all monotone formulae. One might extend
the class Lj by taking advantage of Harrop or hereditarily Har-
rop formulae, cf. [12], which allows us to preserve the disjunction
property of intuitionistic logic in the presence of contexts. This ap-
proach bears semblance with the V 1-HORN theory presented in
[13] which limits induction to a generalisation of Horn clauses.
Another approach might be to use a variant of the deep inference
medial rule [6] to manipulate disjunctions of implications:
(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∨ (ϕ′ ⊃ ψ′)→ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′) ⊃ (ψ ∨ ψ′)
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6.5 Towards a theory for NOR
We do not yet have a full correspondence for NOR, and this reflects
the difficulty in deep inference proof complexity of conducting any
metalogical reasoning at all in NOR, or KS. One approach might
be to incorporate structural restrictions from linear logic, e.g. that
induction formulae must be free of modalities, like in [3]. This
could also allow us to complete the higher-types version of the PW-
translation by allowing recursive application of ⟪·⟫, using linearity
to control resource usage. While this might not be desirable from
the point of view of reasoning, it might allow us to conduct one-
off proofs of soundness of various systems, thereby settling certain
proof complexity questions.
7. Conclusions
We gave uniform versions of monotone and analytic deep infer-
ence proof systems, in the setting of bounded arithmetic. This
constituted an application of a characterisation of certain provable
fixed points, deep inference proof normalisation and intuitionistic
bounded arithmetic to propositional proof complexity. In the case
of monotone proofs we were able to also prove a converse result.
This work further brings research in deep inference in line with
the standards of mainstream proof complexity. By studying restric-
tions of monotone systems we also contribute to ‘bridging the gap’
between weak systems and Hilbert-Frege systems (for which no
nontrivial lower bounds are known), providing finer granularity of
the various subproblems.
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